Quản trị công ty Vấn đề đại diện của các công ty đại chúng tại Việt Nam
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Abstract
Tóm tắt: Hiện nay, quản trị công ty (QTCT) là một chủ đề nóng đối với chính phủ, các công ty đại chúng và các nhà nghiên cứu ở cả nước ngoài và Việt Nam. Nghiên cứu này tập trung vào lý thuyết nền tảng của QTCT là lý thuyết đại diện. Lý thuyết này làm cơ sở cho việc phân tích thực trạng vấn đề đại diện, cụ thể là cấu trúc hội đồng quản trị (HĐQT) của các công ty đại chúng niêm yết trên hai sàn HNX và HOSE của Việt Nam. Nghiên cứu chủ yếu sử dụng phương pháp nghiên cứu tại bàn với việc thu thập tài liệu và số liệu thứ cấp để phân tích thực trạng các công ty đại chúng niêm yết, từ đó đưa ra một số giải pháp gợi ý cho Chính phủ và các doanh nghiệp.
Từ khóa: Vấn đề đại diện, quản trị công ty, hội đồng quản trị.References
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[8] Daily, CM, “Governance Patterns in Bankruptcy Reorganizations”, Strategic Management Journal, 17 (5) (1996), 355-375.
[9] Daily, CM và Dalton, DR, “Board of Directors, Leadership and Strucutre: Control and Performance Implications”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 17 (1993), 65-81.
[10] Dalton, DR, Daily, CM, Ellstrand, AE và Johnson, JL, “Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance”, Strategic Management Journal, 19 (1998), 269-290.
[11] Davis, JH, Schoorman, FD và Donaldson, L, “Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management”, Academy of Management Review, 22 (1997), 20-47.
[12] Davis, SM, “Leading Corporate Governance Indicators”, in LC Keong (ed.), Corporate Governance An Asia-Pacific Critique, Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong (2002).
[13] Fama, EF, “Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2) (1980), 288-307.
[14] Fama, EF và Jensen, MC, “Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (1983), 301-325.
[15] Harrison, JR, “The Strategic Use of Corporate Board Committees”, California Management Review, 30 (1) (1987), 109-125.
[16] IFC, “Cẩm nang Quản trị công ty”. http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/mekongpsdf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/CG+newsletter2 VN/$FILE/CG+newsletter2-VN.pdf (2010).
[17] IFC, “Thẻ điểm quản trị công ty”. http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/mekongpsdf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/CG executive+summary VN/$FILE/CG-executive+summary-VN.pdf (2012).
[18] Jensen, MC và Meckling, WH, “Theory of Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (1976), 305-350.
[19] Keong, LC (ed.), Corporate Governance: An Asia-Pacific Critique, Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong (2002).
[20] Kesner, IF, “Directors' Characteristics and Committee Membership: An Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure and Gender”, Academy of Management Journal, 31 (1988), 66-84.
[21] Lorsch, JW và MacIver, E, “Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards”, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA (1989).
[22] Mace, ML, Directors: Myth and Reality, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA (1971).
[23] Mallin, CA, Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press (2004).
[24] OECD, “Nguyên tắc Quản trị công ty”, http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/45034702.pdf (2004).
[25] O'Sullivan, N và Wong, P, “Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Hostile Take-Overs: Some UK Evidence”, Accounting and Business Research, 29 (1999), 139-155.
[26] Padilla, A., “Can Agency Theory Justify The Regulation Of Insider Trading”, The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 5 (1) (2002), 3-38.
[27] Petra, ST, “The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Informativeness of Earnings”, Economics of Governance, 8 (2) (2007), 129-152.
[28] Rechner, P và Dalton, D, “CEO Duality and Organisational Performance: Longitudinal Study”, Strategic Management Journal, 12 (1991), 155-160.
[29] Roche, J, Corporate Governance in Asia, Routledge, Oxon (2005).
[30] Ross, S.A., “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem”, The American Economic Review, 63 (2) (1973), 134-139
[31] Weir, CM và Laing, D, “Governance Structures, Director Independence and Corporate Performance in the UK”, European Business Review, 13 (2) (2001), 86-94.
[32] Yarmack, D, “Higher Market Value of Companies with a Small Board of Directors”, Journal of Financial Economics, 40 (1996), 185-212.