The Relationships amongst Corporate Governance Structures and Firm Performance: A Potential Research Agenda

Abstract

This paper reviews recent empirical studies on corporate governance to clarify the causal relationships amongst corporate governance structures and firm performance. Based on previous empirical research results, this paper suggests several important but controversial research questions in corporate governance literature. First, whether or not there are casual relationships amongst corporate governance mechanisms (especially boardroom gender diversity and ownership structures) and firm performance once the dynamic nature of these relationships is taken into consideration. Second, whether or not these casual relationships (if any) are moderated by the national governance quality of the country within which firms operate. These two research questions may suggest a potential research agenda in the corporate governance literature.

Keywords

Corporate governance structures, national governance, firm performance, endogeneity, Vietnam

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