Nguyen Phuong Lien

Main Article Content

Abstract

To investigate the role of governance and economic growth at the provincial level, this study conducted the Granger causality test for a panel data of 60 provinces in Vietnam from 2006 to 2014 and found that there is an existence of bi-directional causality linkage between provincial competitiveness (hereafter we call “governance”) and economic growth. Furthermore, running a two-step system generalized method of moments estimation (SGMM), this work shows the general provincial competitiveness index and tax revenue have a significantly positive impact on economic growth at a 1% level in three models. Notably, the effects of components of tax revenue and
sub-provincial competitiveness on growth are diverse. In addition, student rate, and poverty rate relate negatively to economic growth. These findings imply that policymakers should focus on the increasing provincial competitiveness index as well as setting up an effective tax collection system for rising growth. Moreover, local governors are better providing variety of career options to reduce both ratios of student and poverty for sustainable developing economies in their areas.


Keywords


Governance, tax revenue, provincial competitiveness index, economic growth, Granger causality test, SGMM


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