Fraud of Financial Statements at Listed Enterprises on Ho Chi Minh City Securities Department
Main Article Content
Abstract
The study was conducted to identify fraudulent financial statements at listed companies (DNNY) on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) through the Triangular Fraud Platform This is a test of VSA 240. At the same time, the conformity assessment of this model in the Vietnamese market. The results show that the model is based on two factors: the ratio of sales to total assets and return on assets; an Opportunity Factor (Education Level); and two factors Attitude (change of independent auditors and opinion of independent auditors). This model is capable of accurately forecasting more than 78% of surveyed sample businesses and nearly 72% forecasts for non-research firms.
Keywords:
Triangle fraud, financial fraud report, VSA 240.
References
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[6]. Võ Hồng Đức & Phan Bùi Gia Thủy (2014), Quản trị công ty: Lý thuyết và cơ chế kiểm soát, Ấn bản lần 1, Tp.HCM, Nxb Thanh Niên.
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[10]. Lou, Y. I., & Wang, M. L. (2011). Fraud risk factor of the fraud triangle assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Business and Economics Research (JBER), 7(2).
[11]. Perols, J. L., & Lougee, B. A. (2011). The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud. Advances in Accounting, 27(1), 39-53.
[12]. Trần Thị Giang Tân, Nguyễn Trí Tri, Đinh Ngọc Tú, Hoàng Trọng Hiệp và Nguyễn Đinh Hoàng Uyên (2014), “Đánh giá rủi ro gian lận báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết tại Việt Nam”, Tạp chí Phát triển kinh tế, số 26 (1) tr.74-94.
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[14]. Amara, I., Amar, A. B., & Jarboui, A. (2013). Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 3(3), 40-51.
[15]. Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 443-465.
[16]. Beneish, M. D. (1999). The detection of earnings manipulation. Financial Analysts Journal, 55(5), 24-36.
[17]. Persons, O. S. (1995). Using financial statement data to identify factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 11(3), 38-46.
[18]. Summers, S. L., & Sweeney, J. T. (1998). Fraudulently misstated financial statements and insider trading: An empirical analysis. Accounting Review, 131-146.
[19]. Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary accounting research, 13(1), 1-36.
[20]. Loebbecke, J. K., Eining, M. M., & Willingham, J. J. (1989). Auditors experience with material irregularities – Frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing – A journal of practice and Theory, 9(1), 1-28.
[21]. Abbott, L. J., Park, Y., & Parker, S. (2000). The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance, 26(11), 55-68.
[22]. Farber, D. B. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter?. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 539-561.
[23]. Stice, J. D. (1991). Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. Accounting Review, 516-533.
[24]. Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., & Hermanson, D. R. (1999). COSO's new fraud study: What it means for CPAs. Journal of Accountancy, 187(5), 12.
[25]. Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1990). Applied statistical models.Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL.
[26]. Gujarati, D. N. (2009). Basic econometrics. Tata McGraw-Hill Education.
[27]. McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualita-tive Choice Behavior," in Frontiers in Econometrics, P. Zarenm-bka, ed. New York: Academic Press, 105-42.(1989). A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models Without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, 54(3), 1027-1058.
[28]. DA Cohen, ADey, TZ Lys. (2008), “Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods”. The accounting review.
[2]. Hà Thị Thúy Vân (2016), “Thủ thuật gian lận trong lập báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết”, Tạp chí tài chính, kỳ 1, tháng 4/2016 (630).
[3]. Cressey, D. R. (1953). Other people's money; a study of the social psychology of embezzlement. New York, NY, US: Free Press.
[4]. Bộ Tài Chính Việt Nam, (2012). Chuẩn mực kiểm toán Việt Nam số 240 – Trách nhiệm của kiểm toán viên đối với gian lận trong kiểm toán báo cáo tài chính.
[5]. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
[6]. Võ Hồng Đức & Phan Bùi Gia Thủy (2014), Quản trị công ty: Lý thuyết và cơ chế kiểm soát, Ấn bản lần 1, Tp.HCM, Nxb Thanh Niên.
[7]. Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance 26 (11): 55-67.
[9]. Skousen, C. J., Smith, K. R., & Wright, C. J. (2009). Detecting and predicting financial statement fraud: The effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS No. 99. Available at SSRN 1295494.
[10]. Lou, Y. I., & Wang, M. L. (2011). Fraud risk factor of the fraud triangle assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Business and Economics Research (JBER), 7(2).
[11]. Perols, J. L., & Lougee, B. A. (2011). The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud. Advances in Accounting, 27(1), 39-53.
[12]. Trần Thị Giang Tân, Nguyễn Trí Tri, Đinh Ngọc Tú, Hoàng Trọng Hiệp và Nguyễn Đinh Hoàng Uyên (2014), “Đánh giá rủi ro gian lận báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết tại Việt Nam”, Tạp chí Phát triển kinh tế, số 26 (1) tr.74-94.
[13]. Kirkos, E., Spathis, C., & Manolopoulos, Y. (2007). Data mining techniques for the detection of fraudulent financial statements. Expert Systems with Applications, 32(4), 995-1003.
[14]. Amara, I., Amar, A. B., & Jarboui, A. (2013). Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 3(3), 40-51.
[15]. Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 443-465.
[16]. Beneish, M. D. (1999). The detection of earnings manipulation. Financial Analysts Journal, 55(5), 24-36.
[17]. Persons, O. S. (1995). Using financial statement data to identify factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 11(3), 38-46.
[18]. Summers, S. L., & Sweeney, J. T. (1998). Fraudulently misstated financial statements and insider trading: An empirical analysis. Accounting Review, 131-146.
[19]. Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary accounting research, 13(1), 1-36.
[20]. Loebbecke, J. K., Eining, M. M., & Willingham, J. J. (1989). Auditors experience with material irregularities – Frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing – A journal of practice and Theory, 9(1), 1-28.
[21]. Abbott, L. J., Park, Y., & Parker, S. (2000). The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance, 26(11), 55-68.
[22]. Farber, D. B. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter?. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 539-561.
[23]. Stice, J. D. (1991). Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. Accounting Review, 516-533.
[24]. Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., & Hermanson, D. R. (1999). COSO's new fraud study: What it means for CPAs. Journal of Accountancy, 187(5), 12.
[25]. Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1990). Applied statistical models.Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL.
[26]. Gujarati, D. N. (2009). Basic econometrics. Tata McGraw-Hill Education.
[27]. McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualita-tive Choice Behavior," in Frontiers in Econometrics, P. Zarenm-bka, ed. New York: Academic Press, 105-42.(1989). A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models Without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, 54(3), 1027-1058.
[28]. DA Cohen, ADey, TZ Lys. (2008), “Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods”. The accounting review.