Mối quan hệ của tăng trưởng và tính minh bạch trong khu vực công
Main Article Content
Abstract
Nhiều nghiên cứu đã cho thấy mối quan hệ trực tiếp giữa khu vực công với tăng trưởng. Tuy nhiên, không có sự thống nhất trong kết quả nghiên cứu về tác động của khu vực công tới tăng trưởng, đặc biệt là các khía cạnh khác nhau của khu vực công, như: quy mô, mức độ phân cấp, tính minh bạch... Nghiên cứu này tập trung đánh giá mối quan hệ giữa tính minh bạch của khu vực công với tăng trưởng của các quốc gia, sử dụng bộ số liệu Đánh giá về thể chế và chính sách quốc gia (CPIA) của Ngân hàng Thế giới năm 2012. Kết quả cho thấy, có mối quan hệ giữa chất lượng của bộ máy hành chính và tính minh bạch, trách nhiệm giải trình và tham nhũng trong khu vực công tới tăng trưởng GDP. Tác động của việc nâng cao chất lượng bộ máy hành chính tới tăng trưởng GDP là tích cực giống như trong nhiều nghiên cứu trước đây. Ngược lại, chỉ số tính minh bạch, trách nhiệm giải trình và tham nhũng lại có tác động tiêu cực tới tăng trưởng GDP.
Nhận ngày 12 tháng 84 năm 2016, Chỉnh sửa ngày 4 tháng 12 năm 2016, Chấp nhận đăng ngày 26 tháng 12 năm 2016
Từ khóa: Khu vực công, tăng trưởng, tính minh bạch.References
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[3] Alesina, Alberto and Beatrice Weder, “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?”, American Economic Review, 92 (2002) 4, 1126-1137.
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[7] Brunetti, A. & B. Weder, A free press is bad news for corruption. Mimeo WWZ9809, University of Basle, 1999.
[8] Dyck, Alexander, David Moss & Luigi Zingales, Special Interests versus the Media, NBER Working Paper, 2008.
[9] Easterly, William, Ross Levine, & David Roodman, “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment”, American Economic Review 94 (2004) 3, 774-80.
[10] Foster, M., Fozzard, A., Naschold, F. & Conway, T. (2002) How, When and Why Does Poverty Get Budget
[11] Gyimah-Brempong, K., S. Muñoz de Camacho, Corruption, Growth, and Income, 2006.
[12] Hall R. E., Jones C. I., “Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999), 83-116.
[13] James E. Rauch & Peter B. Evans, “Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries a,b, c”, Journal of Public Economics 75 (2000), 49.
[14] Johnson, Simon, John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, “Property Rights and Finance”, American Economic Review, 92 (2002) 5, 1335-56.
[15] Johnson, Simon, John McMillan, & Christopher Woodruff, “Property Rights and Finance”, The American Economic Review 92 (2002) 5, 1335-56.
[16] Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, “Aggregating governance indicators”, Policy, Research Working Paper, no. WPS 2195. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999.
[17] Knack S., Keefer P., “Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternative measures”, Economics and Politics 7 (1995), 207-227.
[18] Leff, Nathaniel, “Economic development through bureaucratic corruption”, The American Behavioral Scientist, 8 (1964), 8-14.
[19] Lui, Francis T., “An equilibrium queuing model of bribery”, Journal of Political Economy, 93 (1985), 760-781.
[20] M. Foster, A. Fozzard, F. Naschold & T. Conway, “How, When and Why does Poverty get Budget Priority: Poverty Reduction Strategy and Public Expenditure in Five African Countries - Synthesis Paper”, ODI Working Paper 168, May 2002.
[21] Mazingo, Christopher, “Effects of Property Rights on Economic Activity: Lessons from the Stolypin Land Reform”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mimeo, 1999.
[22] Olken, Benjamin, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”, Journal of Political Economy 115 (2007) 2, 200-49.
[23] Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995) 3, 681-712.
[24] Paper 168 (London: Overseas Development Institute).
[25] Priority? Poverty Reduction Strategy and Public Expenditure Reform in Five African Countries, Working
[26] Reinikka, Ritva & Jakob Svensson, “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2004a) 2, 679-705.
[27] Rodrik, Dani, “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them”, Draft paper prepared for The International Monetary Fund Conference on Second Generation Reforms, Washington, D.C., November 8-9, 1999.
[28] Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development”, NBER Working Paper No. 9305, 2002.
[29] Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, Emanuele Baldacci, Carlos Mulas-Granados, “Fiscal policy, expenditure composition, and growth in low-income countries”, Journal of International Money and Finance 24 (2005) 441-463.
[30] Timothy Besley, “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana”, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1995) 5, 903-37.
[31] Williamson, John, “Latin American Adjustment: How much has happened”, Washington, D. C: Institute for International Economics, 1990.
[32] World Bank, “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment: An External Panel Review”, The World Bank, April 5, 2004a.